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M A R G A R E T B HALL,
Plaintiff/Appellant,
Case N°

vs.

''20.5 U - C A

PROCESS INSTRUMENTS A N D
C O N T R O L , INC., a Utah corporation
Defendant/Appellee.

STATEMEINil Ill Il" I III III S11 Ill I'll HI II I I

The Utah Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction of this matter pursuant to the
authority granted by I J'l - \i I
ky

virtue 0f a

p0ur

CODE

over o r ( j e r

Al -3 1 1 § 78 2a 3(2)(1 ,) (1,992) : it id specific -all> < ) • : i 1:1 n; • c -a se

entered by the Supreme C ^ u "

'

ase # 920189 following the

notice of appeal filed by Appellant from a Judgment granted in :,v i hiui ...ui.v... • -. : ^ t
Coi in: I: o f Salt I ake Coi mt> „ dismissing Plaintiffs action, no cause of action.

!

Y E M E N I III' ISSIII (IN l i l l ' i ' \L

Appellant's statement c f the issues m jbenic

e

issues and the standard of review with the exception that questions of fact are reviewable
under the clearly erroneous standard. See Wade v. Jobe, 818 P.2d 1023 (I Jtah 1991); Bi 7/ v.
Eldei , 78,2 P,,,,2i il, 5 1:5 ( [ Jtah \ \ »{ „, !„ c >89).

DETERMINATIVE STATUTE
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 78-25-16 (1953)1
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This is an appeal from the judgment of the Third District Court that Plaintiff have
judgment against Defendant of no cause of action.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

This matter was originally filed on May 26, 1982 as an action for wrongful discharge

of Plaintiff Margaret B. Hall (hereinafter "Margaret") as an employee of Defendant Process
Instruments and Control, Inc. (hereinafter "PIC").2
2.

The parties had entered into an employment agreement3 on February 20, 1981 which

agreement had been drafted by attorney Peter Ennenga at the request of John Hall, PIC's
president and sole stockholder.
3.

The PIC filed an answer timely on the 18th of June 1982.4

4.

On April 5, 1984 PIC filed a motion to dismiss.5

5.

On June 18, 1984 PIC's counsel sent notice to the court and opposing counsel that he

had relocated his office.6

See Addendum 1
Record on appeal p. 2
Record on appeal p. 154; Trial Exhibit 1-p
Record of Appeal p. 6
Record on appeal p. 8
Record on appeal p. 9

2

6.

Oi i It igi ist 1.6, 1990 "I*"* lai garet filed a motion foi 1 sa • e to filed ai I ai nended con: lplaint,

a memorandum of points and authorities and. a motion to si ibmit for decision all of which
were apparently sent to PIC's counsel at a previous ado:

* d

given notice of such six years previously."''
7.

Not surprisingly PIC's counsel, filed no responsive pleading and, the court granted the

i notioi i. to ai i i.ei id oi I Septei nbei 13, 1990*. Perhaps b\ typographical error; the wording of the
order was ultimately prophetic.9
8.

The oiih si lbstanti v e an leiicii i iei: it of IV fai gai et's origii iai c :>t i lplaii it is fc und in

paragraph three of her amended complaint wherein she alleges that she was induced to enter
in to the employment agreement by John's promise that she would never have to go to work
iiinl iliji tin nnini'V which she would receive would be in lieu of alimony.10
9.

-v)\\

s

Kail (hereinafter "John") was never made a party to this action, nor was any
ii

10.

iltci " i

1

"

'»'», .'HI'Miip1

"'JLIIII1

'

pit'in 1

"IK

nn-ppr;tk" veil.

'-1 rn;t Vlargaret presented her case and upon her counsel resting, I'M m„-n .» ! v i i

to dismiss.. In response Judge Rokicii made the slafniietii qualcJ |.jilialh, mil I'JaKvtki'.s bnd%
(page i 1). iiv LJohnJ never expected her to come to woi k in the first place. 1 believe this is

Record on appeal p. 1,2
Record on appeal p. 22

Record on appeal p. 22, "the Ain.en.ded Complaint attached to Plaintiffs Motion for Leave to Filed
Amended Complaint is deemed filed as of this late." [emphasis added]
Re c o r d o n, a p p e a 1 p... 1 '! c o nip a i e p. 2
11

Record on appeal p. 148-152 {pretrial order}; 332-333 closing arguments wherein the court states
"1 don't know why somebody didn't bring that up. Alter ego." and it was pointed out to the court that there is no
pleading to support such a claim, p. 334
3

nothing more than an alimony agreement...[Fm not making that judgment, but I will take it
under advisement.]"12 {bracketed portion missing from appellant's quote}
11.

PIC thereafter presented its case, Judge Rokich heard testimony of other witnesses and

changed his opinion from that stated in the previous paragraph.
12.

At the close of the evidence no motion was made to conform the pleading to the

evidence.
13.

Margaret and John had entered into an antenuptial agreement prior to their marriage

which provided among other things that Margaret would not receive alimony.13
14.

The decree of divorce between Margaret and John provided that Margaret would not

receive alimony.14
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I.

This appeal is not an appeal of an alter ego case as appellant's brief suggests.
Margaret's entire appeal relies on the erroneous premise that this is an alter ego case.

Margaret filed suit against PIC for terminating her employment agreement with the
corporation. The relief which she sought was the entire contract benefits for the term of the
agreement. PIC responded that they had terminated her because she failed to report to work.
Moreover, the employment agreement itself provides for semi-monthly payments to Margaret
for the work which she was to perform, not a lump sum payable in installments.
At trial Margaret responded that she was not required to go to work because she had a

Record on appeal p. 251; [ emphasis supplied]
Record on appeal p. 154, Exhibit 7-D
Record on appeal p. 154, Exhibit 6-P
4

prior oral understanding with John by which he agreed on behalf of the corporation that she
would never be required to actually perform services for PIC. John was never made a party
to the action and Margaret never asked the court below to pierce the corporate veil

II.
It is irrelevant whether the employment agreement would have terminated
automatically upon Margaret's remarriage.

This is because there was never any factual finding that the agreement was anything
other than an employment agreement. Margaret's first argument on appeal is that her
employment contract did not terminate on remarriage, which is factually correct - as far as it
goes. It terminated on her failure to honor its clear terms. In her appeal, Margaret
acknowledges, indeed argues, that the agreement was entered into by her with PIC, and not
with John Hall. PIC concedes that the agreement was between them solely, and also
concedes that it did not terminate on remarriage. Alimony was not a subject of the contract,
nor for the first eight years this case languished did Margaret plead that it was.
What Margaret actually sought at trial was a decision that not only was the agreement
entered in lieu of alimony, but that it was one that would continue even if she remarried.
Margaret's disagreement is not with the trial court's true legal conclusion, which is correct
regarding the law; her disagreement is with the interrelationship between that legal conclusion
and the facts of this case. The trial court indeed stated that her claim that the employment
agreement was entered into in lieu of alimony failed because alimony terminates upon
remarriage, absent a written agreement to the contrary. However, there was never a finding
that the agreement was entered into in lieu of alimony. Indeed, the trial court found just the
opposite: Margaret failed to show that the agreements intent and meaning was anything other
5

than what it said it was - an employment agreement to provide her income and benefits
during sickness, and wages and benefits when she could work. And although this is termed a
conclusion of law, it is clearly a factual determination. Thus, whether the agreement
terminated by operation of law upon remarriage was relevant to this case only if the
agreement was in fact (and only questionably then) an agreement in lieu of alimony. That,
however, was not the finding of the court.

III.
The trial court's findings of fact are supported by ample evidence and its
conclusion of law with respect to the parol evidence rule is correct.

Margaret lost and appealed because the trial court failed to accept her version of the
facts as true, which would have required that the lower court ignore, among other things, the
plain language of the agreement which Margaret admits is clear and unambiguous on its face.
Margaret has failed to marshal the evidence in support of the lower court's findings.
The trial court allowed the introduction of parol evidence over objection; however,
after having heard the testimony presented by Margaret's counsel in support of his contention
that the agreement was not an integration, then excluded it for the reason that he found the
employment agreement to be clear and unambiguous. The evidence was heard, but apparently
not believed
Margaret was the plaintiff and was claiming that the plain meaning of the written
contract was ambiguous. Margaret had the burden of proof and failed to sustain her burden.
Under her theory of the case she needed to prove that:
(1) the terms of the written agreement which would have otherwise required that she
actually go to work in fact meant that she did not have to go to work; and,
6

(2) that the contract really provided for the payment of a lump sum ($36,000.00)
payable in 72 semi monthly installments of $500.00 each together with the other fringe
benefits which all of PIC's employees received.
Margaret offered the fact that at the time she entered into the employment agreement
she was suffering from hepatitis and was unable to attend to her work duties as proof that the
agreement was entered into in lieu of alimony. To sustain her burden of proof Margaret
offered her own testimony, which was contradicted by both John and attorney Peter Ennenga
as to her first claim, that the intention of the parties was that she would never have to attend
work.
Margaret offered nothing in support of her second claim that the contract was really a
contract for the payment of a lump sum payable in installments. Margaret's own testimony
does not even suggest that the parties intended to pay Margaret $36,000 over the life of the
contract.
In contrast to Margaret's arguments, which were inconsistent throughout this litigation,
PIC has consistently claimed that the employment agreement means exactly what it says. PIC
paid Margaret during her period of illness in precisely the same manner as it treated other
employees on sick leave. The fact that PIC entered into the employment agreement at a time
when Margaret was ill and unable to presently come to work makes the consideration simply
gratuitous.
IV.

The trial court properly disallowed Brent Turleyfs testimony.

His testimony would have been about a specific act by John Hall some five years
earlier, which act has no direct bearing on the events of this case. As such, that act was

7

greatly attenuated from this case. Not only was the act far removed in time, it dealt with
subject matter and actors that were different than those involved here. Moreover, Mr.
Turley's testimony was offered merely as a prior specific act to show that John Hall later
acted in conformity with that act. This type of evidence, however, is deemed as irrelevant
generally in civil cases and, furthermore, is inadmissible under the Utah Rules of Evidence
except to show something other than propensity. Thus, the testimony would have been
inadmissible, both as irrelevant and as specifically prohibited by the Utah Rules of Evidence.
Even if disallowance of Brent Turley's testimony was error though, it was harmless
error. Here the trial court had the direct testimony of three witness as to the facts in question.
Thus, Brent Turley's attenuated and circumstantial testimony offered little if anything to the
fact finder's understanding. Because this was a bench trial, the fact finder had the benefit of
Margaret's proffer and acknowledged the testimony would be irrelevant. Thus, there is a
reasonable likelihood that a more favorable result would not have been obtained had Brent
Turley testified. Hence, any error was harmless.

ARGUMENT
I
This appeal is not an appeal of an alter ego case as appellant's brief suggests

One fundamental problem with Margaret's theory of this case is that she never plead
that PIC was the alter ego of John. Judge Rokich did comment on that failure, but quite

8

properly refused to allow it to influence his decision.15 All of her arguments transpose PIC
for John; however, she neglected to either plead that theory or to present sufficient evidence
to support it.16

Margaret did not anywhere plead that PIC was merely the alter ego of John,

nor did she ask the lower court to pierce the corporate veil.
The consideration which she claims to have given might have been arguably
consideration to John, but not to PIC. Margaret admits that she entered into an antenuptial
agreement prior to her marriage to John which provided that in the event of divorce she
would not ask for, nor be entitled to alimony. Thus, her claim that the consideration for the
employment agreement (being non-terminable by PIC under any circumstances) was the
foregoing of alimony is an argument constructed of whole cloth. Margaret never had a right
to expect alimony, thus the foregoing of alimony would not have been consideration even for
an agreement with John.
Margaret never explained why she originally filed her complaint based on her

ib

Combe v. Warren's Family Drive-Inns, Inc.,680 P.2d 733 (Utah 1984)
"It is error to
adjudicate issues not raised before or during trial and unsupported by the record. Curran v. Mount, Ala., 657 P.2d
389 (1980). The trial court is not privileged to determine matters outside the issues of the case, and if he does, his
findings will have no force or effect. Brantley v. Carlsbad Irr. Dist., N.M., 587 P.2d 427 (1978). In law or in
equity, a judgment must be responsive to the issues framed by the pleadings, and a trial court has no authority to
render a decision on issues not presented for determination. Any findings rendered outside the issues are a nullity.
Matter of Estate of Hurlbutt, Or. App., 585 P.2d 724 (1978); Credit Investment and Loan Co. v. Guaranty Bank
& Trust Co., Colo., 444 P.2d 633 (1968). A court may not grant judgment for relief which is neither requested by
the pleadings nor within the theory on which the case was tried, whether that theory was expressly stated or implied
by the proof adduced. Leonard Farms v. Carlsbad Riverside Terrace, N.M., 559 P.2d 411 (1977).
16

See Ringwood v. Foreign Auto Works, Inc.JS6 P.2d 1350 (Utah App. 1990)'The corporate form
protects shareholders from personal liability and will be pierced by the courts with great reluctance and caution.
Colman v. Colman, 143 P.2d 782, 786 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). In order to disregard the corporate entity, two
circumstances must be shown: (1) such a unity of interest and ownership that the separate personalities of the
corporation and the individual no longer exist, but the corporation is, instead, the alter-ego of one or a few
individuals; and (2) if observed, the corporate form would sanction a fraud, promote injustice, or result in an
inequity. Id. See also Salt Lake City Corp. v. James Constructors, 761 P.2d 42, 46 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). One
of the factors deemed significant in determining whether this test has been met is the use of the corporation as a
facade for operations of the dominant stockholder. Colman, 743 P.2d at 786."
9

wrongful termination by PIC, rather than what she later claimed at trial was the true basis for
the claim - a claim which arose only after eight years of reflection and the realization that
her original claim was going to be dismissed for failure to prosecute.17

Margaret knew she

would be unable to prevail on her original theory. Margaret did testify that she had read the
employment agreement prior to signing it,18 that she understood the plain meaning of the
wording of the agreement would require that she go to work,19 but that she believed that she
was not really required to do so because of a prior oral understanding between herself and
John.20
Both John and attorney Peter Ennenga testified that they understood the plain meaning
of the agreement to require that Margaret actually go to work upon her recovery from
hepatitis from which she was suffering at the time of the execution of the agreement.
II
Appellant mistakenly argues that "[t]he Defendant corporation's obligation under the
Employment Agreement did not terminate upon Mrs. Hall's remarriage"
{the court simply never made a finding that the agreement involved alimony}
Appellant is factually correct. Whether Margaret remarried had no effect on the
employment agreement; as long as she went to work she would get paid. However, the
evidence was uncontroverted that she never went to work. In fact PIC's obligation to pay
Margaret ended when she had refused to come to work after being instructed to do so and

17

Record on appeal p. 338

18

Record on appeal p. 222, 1. 5

19

Record on appeal p. 223, 11. 18-23

20

Record on appeal, p. 224,1.24 - 225,1.2
10

PIC sent her a termination notice (on May 20, 1982). As the trial court properly concluded in
its memorandum decision, "The employment agreement is clear and unambiguous on its face
and not subject to change by parol evidence."21 The clear and unambiguous terms of the
employment agreement contemplate that Margaret would perform work for PIC which she
admitted she never did at any time relevant to these proceedings.
The trial court correctly applied the standards set forth by the Supreme Court in
Winegar v. Froerer Corp., 813 P.2d 104 (Utah 1991). As Justice Durham stated:
In interpreting a contract, the intentions of the parties are controlling. If the
contract is in writing and the language is not ambiguous, the intention of the parties
must be determined from the words of the agreement. A court may only consider
extrinsic evidence if, after careful consideration, the contract language is ambiguous or
uncertain. A contract provision is ambiguous if it is capable of more than one
reasonable interpretation because of "uncertain meanings of terms, missing terms, or
other facial deficiencies." Faulkner v. Farnsworth, 665 P.2d 1292, 1293 (Utah 1983).
Whether ambiguity exists in a contract is a question of law. [numerous citations
omitted]

The trial court properly took note of the fact that Margaret had claimed for a period of
eight years (1) that the employment contract had a clear and unambiguous meaning, (2) that
she had performed her obligations and (3) that she was able and willing to continue to do so.
Margaret only amended her complaint when "she realized that she was unable to prove that
she had performed or was willing to perform her obligations under the employment agreement
as written."22 Thus, the trial court did not find that the employment agreement had been
entered into in lieu of alimony which was Margaret's allegation in her amended complaint.
Margaret argues that the lower court erred when it concluded as a matter of law that

21

Record on appeal p. 157
Record on appeal p. 172
11

"absent a written agreement to the contrary, alimony terminates upon remarriage".23 This
conclusion of law, however is absolutely correct and, in fact is an almost verbatim statement
of the statute. Hypothetically an agreement to pay the alimony obligation of another,
assuming it complied with the statute of frauds would terminate upon remarriage, unless the
written agreement provided otherwise, (e.g. for a lump sum payable in installments), even
under the cases upon which Margaret had relied below.
What Margaret really is arguing is that the predicate to the legal conclusion is in error,
the predicate being that "Plaintiffs claim that the employment agreement was entered into in
lieu of alimony fails because,...". PIC understands that what the court meant was that if the
employment agreement was in fact an agreement on behalf of PIC to pay Margaret alimony
owed by John, it does not provide that it will continue in force after remarriage or for a
definite term. Thus, it was terminated by operation of law upon Margaret's remarriage.
Margaret was not only asking the trial court to find that the employment agreement
had been entered into in lieu of alimony, but also that it would continue in full force and
effect for a period of three years. Margaret simply did not produce any evidence in support
of her claim on appeal that the employment agreement was non-terminable by PIC for a
period of three years.24
PIC concedes that cases exist in other jurisdictions25 under which agreements entered

Record on appeal p. 172
24

The court concluded "Plaintiff fail to establish that the meaning or intent of the employment
agreement was anything other than its clearly written terms which would give raise to an enforceable agreement
under any one of the legal theories advanced during the course of this litigation." Record on appeal p. 172-173
25

Taliaferro vs Taliaferro, 270 P. 2d 1036 (Cal. App. 1954)

12

into in lieu of alimony have been enforced even after remarriage. However, those cases
follow the logic that parties may contract reasonably among themselves and the plain meaning
of their agreements will not be disturbed. This is not such a case, in fact Margaret is urging
the reverse.
She is asking this court to torture the plain meaning of an employment agreement and
reform it. From Margaret's initial amendment of her complaint in 1990 until more than half
way through the trial of this matter, she claimed that the employment agreement was in
reality an agreement on behalf of the company to pay alimony on behalf of John. It is
extremely significant that she did not claim until very late in the proceedings that the
agreement was in reality a settlement agreement to pay its entire benefits regardless of
whether she worked.
At closing argument, Margaret asked the court to reform the agreement to read as a
settlement agreement to require PIC, not her former husband, to make a lump sum payment,
payable in installments to Margaret whether she ever worked for the company or not. The
trial court made short work of her argument, which was presented to the lower court for the
first time in Plaintiffs closing argument. In a colloquy between the court and plaintiffs
counsel, Mr. Mitchell told the court that the agreement was neither an employment agreement
(Plaintiffs original claim) nor an alimony agreement (Plaintiffs amended claim), but "it's a
settlement agreement."26
Margaret's argument on appeal presupposes the trial court had concluded as a factual
matter that the employment agreement was an agreement on behalf of the corporation to pay

26

Record on appeal p. 150-151
13

an alimony obligation of its president John. Judge Rokich specifically found that Margaret
first made the claim that the employment agreement had been entered into in return for a
promise to forego alimony only when she realized that she would be unable to prove that she
had performed the obligations of the contract which was her claim for more than eight years
of litigation.27 Judge Rokich considered the fact that Margaret had waited eight years before
filing her amended complaint as a significant fact in his determination and stated on the
record " I probably should never have allowed the amended complaint, but I always like to
give everybody their day in court.".28
Further the trial court found that the purpose of the employment agreement was to
provide Margaret with income and medical insurance during a period while she was suffering
from hepatitis. A condition from which she was suffering at the time the agreement was
signed.29 The lower court did not find that the corporation ever had any obligation to pay
alimony to Margaret and Margaret did not allege that the corporation stood in the shoes of
John. Nor did the court make a finding that Margaret was suffering from any terminal
disease or permanent disability and in fact she appeared quite well during the course of the
proceedings, a fact which would only be apparent to the trial court and those in attendance,
not to the appellate court.

Thus, the trial court did not conclude that the purpose of the

agreement would necessarily continue indefinitely.
Ill
The lower court's findings of fact are supported by ample evidence and its conclusion of

27

Record on appeal p. 172
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Record on appeal p. 335
Record on appeal p. 171
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law with respect to the parol evidence rule is correct.

Margaret's second argument on appeal is that the lower court's findings of fact and
conclusions of law with respect to the parol evidence rule are unsupported by the evidence or
the law. Margaret fails to note that the court did allow parol evidence to be introduced,
subject to exclusion, so that she would have the opportunity of proving that the written
agreement was neither an integration nor a partially integrated contract.30 Having allowed the
evidence to be admitted conditionally, the trial court properly did not allow the parol evidence
to alter the clear and unambiguous meaning of the written agreement.
The written agreement between Margaret and PIC was clearly at a minimum a
partially integrated contract. Margaret's claim has never been that the employment agreement
was not at least a partially integrated agreement, otherwise she would have been faced with a
myriad of nasty alternatives, e.g., "Statute of Frauds" and Res Judicata.
"The doctrine of partial integration is that where a written contract is obviously not, or
is shown not to be, the complete contract, parol evidence not inconsistent with the writing is
admissible to show what the entire contract really was, by supplementing, as distinguished
from contradicting, the writing. In such a case parol evidence to prove the part not reduced
to writing is admissible, although it is not admissible as to the part reduced to writing.

i0

Record on appeal p. 172; Ringwood v. Foreign Auto Works, Inc.,671 P.2d 182 (Utah 1983)
Since the issue of whether a contract is integrated is a factual question, the trial court's determination will be
sustained on appeal if there is substantial evidence to support it. Bullfrog Marina, Inc. v. Lentz, 28 Utah 2d 261,
501 P.2d 266 (1972); 3 Corbin on Contracts §582, at 457 & n.86 (1960). See also Ute-Cal Land Development v.
Intermountain Stock Exchange, Utah, 628 P.2d 1278 (1981); Berkeley Bank for Cooperatives v. Meibos, Utah, 607
P.2d 798 (1980); Elton v. Utah State Retirement Board, 28 Utah 2d 368, 503 P.2d 137 (1972).
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30 AM.JUR.2D, Evidence § 1043."31
The trial court found that Margaret had failed "to establish that the meaning or intent
of the employment agreement was anything other than its clearly written terms which would
give rise to an enforceable agreement under any one of the legal theories advanced during the
course of this litigation."32
"There is a rebuttable presumption that a written contract which appears to be complete
and certain is integrated. Courts are not obligated to rewrite contracts entered into by parties
dealing at arms1 length, to relieve one party from a bargain later regretted, simply on supposed
equitable principles. The mere raising of a non-integration claim will not result in automatic
admission of extrinsic evidence."33
The trial court's conclusion is not erroneous and Margaret's failure to rebut the
presumption is fatal to her claim on appeal.
Margaret premises her arguments against the trial court's factual findings on her view
of what the evidence should have proven.
In Smith v. Utah Central Credit Union, 727 P.2d 219 (Utah 1986) the Supreme Court
stated:
When an appellant challenges the failure of the trier of fact to accept his
version of the facts, our review is strictly limited. We view the evidence and its
inferences in a light most favorable to the judgment and findings. They will not be
disturbed when based upon substantial, competent, admissible evidence. Kimball v.
Campbell, 699 P.2d 714 (Utah 1985). When the evidence conflicts, we necessarily
give deference to the fact finder and acknowledge his advantageous position vis-a-vis

31

Stanger v. Sentinel Security Life Insurance Co.,669 P.2d 1201 (Utah 1983)
Record on appeal pp. 172-173

33

Webb v. R.OA. General, /wc.,804 P.2d 547 (Utah App. 1991)[citations omitted]
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the witnesses, the evidence, and the parties. DeVas v. Noble, 13 Utah 2d 133, 137,
369 P.2d 290, 293 (1962). Accordingly, because the evidence is sufficient to support
the determination of the court below, we do not undertake to reweigh the evidence or
redetermine the facts. We will not disturb the trial court's determination that there
was no agreement between the parties as alleged by plaintiff. See Ringwood v.
Foreign Auto Works, Inc., 671 P.2d 182 (Utah 1983) .

First Margaret claims that the consideration given to PIC was her agreement to forego
her claim to alimony against John and secondly she claims that the agreement, contrary to its
written terms was an agreement to pay a lump sum of $36,000.00 in $1,000.00 per month
installments.
In support of her first claim Margaret cites this court to a portion of the record where
Judge Rokich stated "I believe this is nothing more than an alimony agreement. ...I'm not
making that judgment, but I will take it under advisement."34 Significantly Margaret
failed to quote the emphasized portion of the transcript, nor to advise this court that the
statement by Judge Rokich was at the close of Plaintiffs evidence. Defendant had not
presented its case at that point. Upon hearing all of the evidence Judge Rokich was
apparently persuaded that the agreement was not an alimony agreement, but rather an
agreement which provided Margaret with insurance and income benefits during a period of
illness.
Perhaps the most telling testimony presented on the subject of whether the
employment agreement had been entered into in lieu of alimony was that of Peter Ennenga
who testified that he was a friend of both parties,35 that he had refused to represent either in a

34

Record on appeal p. 251 [emphasis supplied]

3

Record on appeal p. 292, 1. 5
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contested divorce,36 but that he had later processed an uncontested divorce for them37 and that
he had drafted the employment agreement.38 Mr. Ennenga was emphatic, and despite
persistent cross examination by Margaret's counsel, did not waiver on the point that the
employment agreement was ngt entered into upon consideration of Margaret waiving her
claimed right to alimony.39
The simple explanation for why payments had been made for 14 months was that
Margaret had been ill at the time the agreement was executed and it was not contemplated
that she would immediately go to work, but that she would commence her employment upon
her recovery.40 When she had recovered and was able to go to work she obtained other
employment and was ultimately terminated by PIC.
The second prong of Margaret's argument is not supported by any evidence
whatsoever. No one testified and no document supports her claim that the employment
agreement was for a lump sum payable in installments. No pleading makes such a suggestion
and in fact the theory arose for the first time in closing arguments.
Margaret suggests that she has marshalled all of the evidence in support of the trial
court's factual findings. She acknowledges that the agreement is clear and unambiguous on
its face. She acknowledges that both John and attorney Peter Ennenga testified that the

36

Record on appeal p. 292, 1.1. 9-15

37

Record on appeal p 293, 11. 9-22

38

Record on appeal p. 314, 11.11-14

39

Record on appeal p. 297, 1. 13

40

See testimony of Peter Ennenga, Record on appeal pp. 297-299; 310
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agreement was not entered into in lieu of alimony, which was contrary to her contention.
Margaret then goes on to characterize the explanations given for why she continued to receive
benefits even after she had recovered from her illness and had obtained other employment as
"comical."41 The fact that John's memory of events which had transpired ten years previously
became confused upon cross-examination proves nothing. That the company continued to pay
Margaret after it might have otherwise terminated her is not evidence of an agreement to pay
a lump sum in installments. One can speculate that perhaps she was paid because she was
such an incredibly difficult ex-wife concerning the sale of John's house that no one wanted
the responsibility of terminating her prior to that date, or perhaps a payroll clerk felt sorry for
her, or perhaps that she concealed her working for another company, or perhaps almost any
other explanation, but it is all speculation and does not constitute evidence.
If a party is attempting to prove that the plain meaning of a written agreement was not
what the parties intended, it appears that the minimum she should have to do is show what
was really intended. Margaret has failed to prove her case. If the employment contract didn't
have the plain meaning of its words, then what was it? Judge Rokich asked Margaret's
eatedly what he claimed the agreement represented.42 Clearly there is ample
L support of the fact that it was not an agreement to pay alimony. Margaret had
) an antenuptial agreement prior to her marriage to John. The Decree of Divorce
vides that she will not receive alimony. Margaret did not testify that the
it agreement was a settlement agreement, much less anyone else.

Appellant's brief p. 15
Record on appeal p. 329
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In Webb v. R.O.A. General, Inc., 804 P.2d 547 (Utah App. 1991) this court has
quoted State Bank of Lehi v. Woolsey, 565 P.2d 413, 418 (Utah 1977) "parol evidence of
'contemporaneous conversations, representations or statements will not be received for the
purpose of varying or adding to the terms of the written agreement'. Therefore, in most
instances, where a binding agreement exists, whether completely or partially integrated,
evidence of prior or contemporaneous agreements or discussions is not admissible to
contradict terms of the written agreement. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), CONTRACTS § 215."

IV
The trial court properly disallowed the testimony of Brent Turley.

A.

There was no abuse of discretion.

According to Brent Turley's preliminary testimony and counsel's proffer, the gist of
Mr. Turley's disallowed testimony was that, sometime in 1977, John verbally offered to
purchase Brent Turley's house using an employment contract for the down payment.43
Margaret contended this evidence was relevant to show that John had a supposed tendency or
propensity to use employment contracts in certain contexts having to do with personal
obligations. The trial court, however, had ample reason to determine that this episode (the
"Turley episode") was irrelevant to this case. Thus, there was no abuse of discretion in
disallowing Brent Turley's testimony.
The Turley episode was so attenuated from this case as to be irrelevant for several

Record on appeal p.p. 0238 and 0239.
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reasons. First, the episode was remote in time from the facts of this case, having occurred
some five years previously. Although the issue of remoteness generally goes to the weight,
rather than admissibility of evidence, it is clearly a factor in the weighing process used to
determine relevance and admissibility.44
probative value becomes.45

The more remote in time an event is, the less its

Thus, at some point in time, the probative value of evidence,

such as prior specific acts, becomes nil. Evidence of no probative value is irrelevant by
definition and therefore inadmissible.46
It is unclear exactly when any given type of evidence loses its probative value due to
the passage of time. Moreover, no Utah civil cases deal with the effect of time on propensity
evidence such as the Turley episode would have presented. But the relevance of evidence
similar to the Turley episode has been addressed elsewhere, and this provides guidelines for
this court to determine whether the trial court abused its discretion in disallowing Brent
Turley's testimony.
In Rocky Mountain Helicopters, Inc. v. Bell Helicopters Textron , A Division of
Textron, Inc.,41 the appellate court ruled the trial court had correctly deemed as irrelevant, a
chief pilot's evaluation of another pilot's skills five months before an accident. The five
month time frame was too remote with respect to the accident and, hence, the trial court
properly disallowed its introduction to show the pilot was acting in a similar manner on the

44

Terry v. Zioris Coop. Mercantile Inst, 605 P.2d 314, 330 n.30 (Utah 1979).

45

Weber Basin Water Conservancy Dist v. Ward, 10 Utah 2d 29, 347 P.2d 862 (1959).

46

UTAH R. EVID. 401 and 402 (1992); see Shorr v. Unsell, 497 P.2d 1060 (Idaho 1966) (when
remoteness becomes so great that there is no probative value, proffered evidence should be excluded).
47

805 F.2d 907 (10th Cir. 1986).
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day in question.48
In Leigh v. Swartz,49 the plaintiff had sued for fraudulent misrepresentations involving
a real estate contract. The Arizona court held that a real estate closing statement involving
the subject property and created 10 1/2 months before the contract was inadmissible. It was
too remote in time and the conditions were not shown to be the same.
The Utah Supreme Court in Jensen v. Logan City, addressed the issue of remoteness
in the context of negligence actions and has held that the trial court did not err in allowing
testimony as to the condition of a wire fence two hours before the accident.50 In assessing the
impact of remoteness on the trial court's decision to allow or exclude evidence of previous
conditions the Court said:
Between certain limits it must be left to the trial court to determine whether the
observations of a witness [are] too remote to be probative. . . . It is that class
of cases which lie in the zone where minds could reasonably differ as to
whether the observation was too remote. . . . [that] the matter should be left
entirely to the trial judge's discretion.51
Although the context of that case differs, the concept is applicable. Roughly five
years passed between the time of the Turley episode and the execution of the contract at
issue. That is 12 times the amount of time at issue in Rocky Mountain Helicopters, and over
5 times the amount of time in Leigh. Notably, the evidence that was held admissible in
Jensen, was evidence of conditions only two hours prior. Whether an occurrence is too

48

Id.

49

74 Ariz. 108, 245 P.2d 262 (1952).

50

89 Utah 347, 57 P.2d 708 (1936).

51

Id. at 717 (citing 1 WlGMORE ON EVIDENCE, 517, § 438).
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remote to be relevant is a fact sensitive inquiry and many factors may impact it. But here,
based on the length of time alone, it cannot be said that the trial abused its discretion in
ruling evidence of the Turley episode as irrelevant.
Remoteness aside though, there are other factors from which the trial court could
determine Mr. Turley's testimony was irrelevant. In addition to time, the relevance of specific
instance evidence of other contracts has been held in Utah to depend on two factors: (1)
identicalness of the contracts and (2) similarity of the parties to the contracts.52 With respect
to identicalness, the circumstances of the Turley episode differ so radically from the contract
at issue here as to make them incomparable. For example, the Turley episode had nothing to
do with alimony or agreements to forgo alimony, which was the eventual thrust of Margaret's
argument at trial. Nor is there any conceivable explanation of how an offer on real estate
could relate to the contractual dispute in this case. Finally, and the trial court made specific
note of this fact, no contract ever resulted from the Turley episode. Thus, there is no
identicalness between the Turley episode and the employment agreement.
The issue of similarity of parties also points to irrelevancy. PIC and Margaret are the
parties to this action, but neither of them was a participant in the Turley episode. Nor did
that episode involve persons remotely similar to the parties in this action. Admittedly,
Margaret's counsel opined that John Hall made an offer to Turley as "agent" for PIC. But if,
by comparing the contract at issue to the Turley episode, Margaret seeks to ascribe the acts of
the defendant PIC to John Hall, or vice versa, she must fail: The issues of alter ego and
piercing the corporate veil were never raised at trial, nor alleged in any pleading. And

See Leger Construction Inc. v. Roberts, Inc., 550 P.2d 212 (Utah 1976).
23

absent this, the Turley episode is completely irrelevant to this case.
Thus, the excluded testimony was amply attenuated from this case in terms of time,
subject matter and the parties involved. The trial court had a substantial basis to determine its
probative value was nil and exclude Mr. Turley's testimony. There was no abuse of
discretion.

B.

The Utah Rules of Evidence prohibit the admission of Brent Turley's
testimony.

Even if it were slightly relevant, the Utah Rules of Evidence obligated the trial court
to exclude Mr. Turley's testimony. Those rules state that even relevant evidence of certain
kinds is not admissible if the rules of evidence so provide.53 Just such a prohibition operates
in this case, for those rules also state:
Evidence of other . . . acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person
in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith.54
The Turley episode had no direct bearing on this case; it was evidence of an act
offered merely to show that Mr. Hall somehow acted in conformity with that act on a
subsequent occasion. Thus, it falls squarely within that type of propensity evidence that is
generally inadmissible under Rule 404(b).
It appears that at the appellate level, this rule has only been applied in criminal cases
in Utah. Perhaps this is because the general consensus is that, even without Rule 404(b),

UTAHR. EVID. 402 (1992).
UTAH. R. EVID. 404(b) (1992).
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propensity or character evidence is inadmissible in civil trials - period.5" Nonetheless, Rule
404(b) is applicable and has been applied in civil cases.56
Although not mentioned specifically, Rule 404(b) was an implicit basis on which the
trial court excluded testimony about the Turley episode. Evidence of prior specific acts may
be admissible if introduced to show something other than that the party acted in conformity
with that prior act, e.g. to show knowledge or plan.57 Following counsel's proffer of Brent
Turley's testimony, the court stated: "You've got to show more than just one other occasion.
That may be a method under which he operates, but nevertheless I don't see where it's
relevant to this case."58

Thus the court determined that even it it was a method under which

John operated, the proffer of the episode was inadequate to show a common scheme or plan.59
Indeed, under these circumstances, had the trial court admitted Brent Turley's testimony, it
would have committed error by admitting evidence that is inadmissible under the rules of
evidence.

C.

bb

If Exclusion of Brent Turley's testimony was error, it was harmless
error.

WEINSTEIN ON EVIDENCE,

H 404(01) (July 1992); 1A

WIGMORE, EVIDENCE,

§ 64 (Tiller's Rev.

1983).
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Rocky Mountain Helicopters, 805 F.2d 907 (10th Cir. 1986); see Turley v. State Farm Mutual Auto
Ins. Co., 944 F.2d 669 (10th Cir. 1991) (evidence of prior bad acts admissible in civil case to show intent,
knowledge, lack of mistake, etc.).
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UTAH R. EVID. 404(b) (1992); see State v. Hamilton, 174 Utah Adv. Rep. 7, (1991) (for evidence
of another specific act to be admissible, it must have some purpose other than showing that the charges are
consistent with the defendant's character).
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And it was clearly inadequate as evidence of habit under UTAH R. EVID. 406 (1992).
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The rule is that, to be reversible, an error must have been substantial and prejudicial;
unless there is a reasonable likelihood that a more favorable result would have been obtained
absent the error, the error is harmless.00 Applied here this means that even if Brent Turley's
testimony had some probative value, excluding it was harmless error. First, there were three
other witnesses who gave direct testimony about the formation of the contract at issue. Brent
Turley's indirect testimony offered little, if anything, that was not already addressed by
evidence of more probative value. Thus, there was a significant quantity of separate
competent evidence upon which the trier of fact could base its findings.
Second, this was a nonjury trial. Judge Rokich heard Margaret's counsel's proffer as
to Brent Turley's testimony and, indeed, he acknowledged that "[t]hat may be a method under
which he operates."61 Thus, even if Brent Turley's testimony was not formally "admitted," it
cannot be said that the Turley episode went unnoticed or was not given the weight it
deserved.62 Indeed, even had it been "admitted", its probative value would have been virtually
nil, as the finder of fact, understandably, could not see its relevance. Such an "error" is
neither substantial or prejudicial; nor would the result have been likely to differ. Hence,
exclusion of the testimony, if error it was, was harmless error.
CONCLUSION
The judgment of the lower court should be affirmed. The lower court's findings of
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Harris v. Utah Transportation Authority, 671 P.2d 217 (Utah 1983); Eager v. Willis, 17 Utah 2d
314, 410 P.2d 1003 (Utah 1966); In re Baxter's Estate, 16 Utah 2d 284, 399 P.2d 442 (1965).
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was accepted "for what it was worth," appellate court assumed it was disregarded as case was before the bench.)
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fact are not clearly erroneous and its conclusions of law are correct. Margaret has presented
nothing more on appeal, nor could she have legitimately, than she did to the court below.
The evidence submitted to the lower court simply did not warrant a judgment in her favor
under any of her three separate theories of recovery.
Respectfully submitted this ^V day of November, 1992.

Richard &. Golden, /Attorney for Appellee
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Addendum 1

FULL TEXT OF STATUTES & RULES
Statutes
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 78-2a-3(2) (1953 as amended 1992)

Court of Appeals jurisdiction.

(2)
The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of
interlocutory appeals, over:
(a-j)...
(k)
(3)

cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court.

...

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 78-25-16 (1953) - Parol evidence of contents of writings - When

admissible.
There can be no evidence of the contents of a writing, other than the writing itself, except in
the following cases:
(1)
When the original has been lost or destroyed, in which case proof of the loss or
destruction must first be made.
(2)
When the original is in the possession of the party against whom the evidence
is offered and he fails to produce it after reasonable notice.
(3)
When the original is a record or other document in the custody of a public
officer.
(4)
When the original has been recorded, and the record or a certified copy thereof
is made evidence by this code or other statute.
(5)
When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which
cannot be examined in court without great loss of time, and the evidence sought from them is
only the general result of the whole.
Provided, however, if any business, institution, member of a profession or calling, or
any department or agency of government, in the regular course of business or activity has
kept or recorded any memorandum, writing, entry, print, representation or combination
thereof, of any act, transaction, occurrence or event, and in the regular course of business has
caused any or all of the same to be recorded, copied or reproduced by any photographic,
photostatic, microfilm, microcard, miniature photographic, or other process which accurately
reproduces or forms a durable medium for so reproducing the original, the original may be
destroyed in the regular course of business unless its preservation is required by law; and
such reproduction, when satisfactorily identified, is as admissible in evidence as the original
itself in any judicial or administrative proceeding whether the original is in existence or not,
an enlargement or facsimile of such reproduction is likewise admissible in evidence if the
original reproduction is in existence and available for inspection under direction of court. The
introduction of a reproduced record, enlargement or facsimile, does not preclude admission of
Addendum 1

the original.
In the cases mentioned in subdivisions (3) and (4), a copy of the original, or of the
record, must be produced; in those mentioned in subdivisions (1) and (2), either a copy or
oral evidence of the contents.
(as last amended by Chapter 165, Laws of Utah 1983)

Rules
UTAH R. EVID. 401. Definition of "relevant evidence."
"Relevant evidence" means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of
any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less
probable than it would be without the evidence.

UTAH R. EVID. 402. Relevant evidence generally admissible; irrelevant evidence
inadmissible.
All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the Constitution
of the United States or the Constitution of the state of Utah, statute, or by these rules, or by
other rules applicable in courts of this state. Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible.
UTAH R. EVID. 404. Character evidence not admissible to prove conduct; exceptions;
other crimes.
(a)
Character evidence generally. Evidence of a person's character or a trait of his
character is not admissible for the purpose of proving that he acted in conformity therewith on
a particular occasion, except:
(1)
Character of accused. Evidence of a pertinent trait of his character offered by
an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same;
(2)
Character of victim. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character of the victim of
the crime offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same, or evidence of a
character trait of peacefulness of the victim offered by the prosecution in a homicide case to
rebut evidence that the victim was the first aggressor;
(3)
Character of witness. Evidence of the character of a witness, as provided in , ,
Rules 607, 608, and 609.
(b)
Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not
admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity
therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.

Addendum 2

UTAH R.

EVID.

608. Evidence of character and conduct of witness.

(a)
Opinion and reputation evidence of character. The credibility of a witness may
be attacked or supported by evidence in the form of opinion or reputation, but subject to these
limitations: (1) the evidence may refer only to character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, and
(2) evidence of truthful character is admissible only after the character of the witness for
truthfulness has been attacked by opinion or reputation evidence or otherwise.
(b)
Specific instances of conduct. Specific instances of the conduct of a witness,
for the purpose of attacking or supporting his credibility, other than conviction of crime as
provided in Rule 609, may not be proved by extrinsic evidence. They may, however, in the
discretion of the court, if probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness, be inquired into on
cross-examination of the witness (1) concerning his character for
truthfulness or untruthfulness, or (2) concerning the character for truthfulness or untruthfulness
of another witness as to which character the witness being cross-examined has testified.
The giving of testimony, whether by an accused or by any other witness, does not
operate as a waiver of his privilege against self-incrimination when examined with respect to
matters which relate only to credibility.
(c)
Evidence of bias. Bias, prejudice or any motive to misrepresent may be shown
to impeach the witness either by examination of the witness or by evidence otherwise
adduced.
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